War on a false premise

The resignation of US weapons inspector David Kay has confirmed what many, including the Holy See, have long believed: Iraq evidently did not possess weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and was not capable of launching an attack on western targets within 45 minutes.

This conclusion surely undermines the integrity of President George W Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, whose invasion of Iraq was predicated on pre-empting these supposed threats.

In The Southern Cross of September 11-15, 2002 – 17 months ago – we said that “it remains vague what precisely an attack on Iraq would pre-empt.” This reflected a widespread concern across the world.

Responding to such concerns, Messrs Bush and Blair sought to build a case for an invasion of Iraq. It failed to convince much of the world, notably the United Nations Security Council.

Ultimately even Mr Blair, who faced immense public opposition to the war at home, and Mr Bush must concede that their stated reason for invading a sovereign country was based on a false premise.

Both leaders earlier this month announced commissions of inquiry into the intelligence – particularly that provided by the CIA and National Security Agency in the US and the MI6 in Britain – they used to justify the war.

One may predict that the intelligence agencies will be censured for lapses of competence.

It is less clear to what extent these commissions will investigate the manner in which information, flawed or otherwise, was used by the Bush and Blair governments.

It has been suggested that the US and British governments used intelligence, some of it already discredited, only when it suited their pro-war argument, and discounted knowledge and caveats that would not further the case for an invasion of Iraq.

One must question to what extent US and British leaders knew that their rhetoric incorporated untruths.

Even if the intelligence provided was erroneous, one may wonder why Messrs Bush and Blair might have been so naive as to place their trust exclusively in information that was disputed and even discredited by alternative, credible sources, in many cases well before the invasion of Iraq commenced.

If their sole reason for invading Iraq was to root out the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s use of the putative WMDs – and Mr Blair did make it clear that he had no other objective – why were alternative sources of intelligence not utilised?

Why did they not accept the word of Dr Hans Blix, the United Nations’ chief weapons inspector, who could make no solid case for the existence of WMDs?

Why did they summarily dismiss intelligence provided by other countries?

Why did they ignore the Vatican, with its sophisticated diplomatic network and strategic neutrality?

The shortcomings, if any, of the intelligence services must not eclipse the way their information was handled by governments. The world must be told how much of what the US and British governments told us about WMDs was based on tainted intelligence, and how much was distorted and exaggerated by politicians.

It may be scant comfort to know that the war, which the Holy See worked hard to prevent, has been proved illegitimate – especially to the Iraqis who, according to US Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, are no better off now than they were before.