The revolution eats itself

by Editor · August 13, 2008

The revolution which leaders of the African National Congress likes to refer to is at risk of eating itself.

Belligerent language ascribing �counter-revolutionary� sentiments to those one disagrees with increasingly serves as a basis for purging political opponents within the tripartite alliance, and to undermine perceived adversaries in the state�s institutions. While the sober observer flinches from drawing tempting analogies with the excesses of Stalinism, recent developments give rise to anxiety for the condition of the ANC and, more seriously, for our young democracy (which already is endangered by an increasing blurring of the lines between political party, government and state).

South Africa�s future is tied to the health of the ANC, which presently faces a schism. It may be argued that a clean split in the ANC which might give rise to two electorally competitive parties would benefit our democracy. In the long-term, the notion of two competitive parties contesting elections would be eminently desirable. However, in the present political climate, when leaders pledge kamikaze martyrdom for a candidate and defame those whom they see as opponents, a split within the ANC could well result in conditions akin to a civil war. The attempted murder of Western Cape secretary Mcebisi Skwatsha bodes ill.

There are elements in the ANC-led alliance which lack the discipline required in a stable democracy. Political discourse in a sound democracy must be robust. However, recent outbursts by the populist likes of Congress of South African Trade Unions general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi and ANC youth League president Julius Malema, who promised to �kill for [Jacob] Zuma�, and those by the veterans association of the ANC�s decommissioned military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe, exceed the boundaries of robust debate.

One might well relegate their statements to erratic exuberance if these had not found apparent favour within the ANC leadership, which did next to nothing to distance itself from such inflammatory rhetoric. Instead ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe virtually ratified such threats by invoking a counter-revolutionary conspiracy even among the judiciary.

It is difficult not to conclude that talk of killing for Zuma is a deliberate strategy to firstly discourage whatever constitutional processes may legitimately impede Mr Zuma�s ascension to the presidency, and secondly to prepare for a violent reaction should Mr Zuma not become president.

At the same time it is fair to note that the exaggerated vilification of Mr Zuma in certain sectors of South African society has fuelled a siege mentality among his supporters.

While Mr Zuma�s moral character raises legitimate concerns about his suitability for the country�s presidency, Zuma supporters are right to question why only he is being charged with corruption emanating from the arms deal, and not those of his comrades who may have benefitted even more from kickbacks. Perhaps it should be a priority for Zuma supporters to press for a full and thorough investigation into corruption involving the arms, with a view to prosecuting guilty parties, instead of seeking to delegitimise the indictment of their patron.

Pending which of his more reckless supporters Mr Zuma can disassociate himself from when he becomes president (as seems most likely), he may well turn out to be a better president than Thabo Mbeki. However, such confidence seems misplaced when Mr Zuma fails to exhibit temperate leadership in not renouncing menacing rhetoric in his support. In absence of a statement to the contrary, we must presume that Mr Zuma endorses the notion of people killing�� and therefore others dying � in his name.

A presidency bought with blood, or even the threat of blood, cannot enjoy unqualified legitimacy. This, not Mr Zuma�s legal troubles, constitutes the biggest threat to South Africa�s democratic revolution.